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DONDORP aND DE WERT introduction of universally offered preconception carrier screening for a wide range of autosomal or X-linked recessive disorders will probably further add to this awareness in the near future. 4 In this paper we argue that cPGD affects the ethics of PGD in two important respects. Firstly, cPGD allows a less restrictive policy with regard to acceptable PGD indications than the widely endorsed 'high risk of a serious disorder' standard. More specifically: if the primary indication meets that standard, the secondary condition in cPGD need not be 'high risk and serious' as well. Secondly, in so far as this leads to PGD for conditions with a lower risk and/or a less serious impact, cPGD to some extent also allows loosening the traditional rule that embryos found to be affected by the very mutation or abnormality tested for, should not be transferred. We will discuss
how this changes what patients may expect from PGD and how PGD professionals can responsibly respond to these expectations.
We limit our discussion of cPGD to scenarios in which the prospective parents are at a known high transmission risk for more than one condition. In order not to unduly complicate the analysis, we will not also explore the scenario of combining PGD with preimplantation screening for aneuploidies (PGS) . 5 Not only is the effectiveness of PGS still highly debated, 6 it is also offered for a different reason than PGD.
We also disregard cases in which PGD aimed at avoiding a specific transmission risk is combined with PGD for human leukocyte antigen (HLA)-typing, 7 as the latter has the different aim of ensuring that the future child will be a suitable bone marrow donor for a sibling.
In addition to cPGD, we will discuss a further variant that we will call 'added PGD' (aPGD). This refers to PGD when offered to couples who have a fertility problem that gives them an indication for IVF even apart from their indication for PGD. In these cases, PGD proper -that is, the PGD stages of embryo biopsy, diagnosis and selective transfer -is 'added', so to speak, to the fertility treatment that the applicants are having anyway. Whereas cPGD is a relatively new phenomenon, aPGD is not. In fact, a significant part of PGD procedures has always been done for couples who also have a fertility problem. Although -as we will argue -aPGD and cPGD have similar or partly similar implications for the ethics of PGD, these have not until now been given much attention in societal and professional debates about the conditions under which PGD may responsibly be offered and performed. This paper aims to address this lacuna for both aPGD and cPGD.
In Section 2 of this paper, we will review the debate about acceptable indications for PGD and explore to what extent aPGD and cPGD might lead to reconsidering relevant codes of practice.
In Section 3, we will do the same with regard to the debate on responsible transfer decisions. The conclusion section reports our recommendations.
| ACCEP TAB LE P G D IND I C ATI ON S
As compared with the alternative option of prenatal diagnosis, PGD has the advantage of preceding the establishment of pregnancy and thus spares the woman and her partner difficult decision making about whether or not to continue the pregnancy if the foetus is diagnosed with the condition that they are at risk of transmitting.
However, PGD comes with a complex range of ethically or otherwise challenging aspects of its own. 
| Issues and concerns
First, the necessary IVF procedures are burdensome and not entirely without risk for the woman, who in most cases will be normally fer- f r o m : h t t p: //w w w. e j u s t i c e . j u s t .f g ov. b e /c g i _ l o i /c h a n g e _ l g . p l ? l a n g u a g e = n - couples who want to avoid the transmission of more than one condition at the same time (cPGD). 26 Here we further explore these suggestions.
In couples requesting aPGD, the burdens and risks for the woman connected to IVF/ICSI have already been incurred, meaning that this paternalist argument for holding on to a strict limit loses any weight that it might have in the balance. The same goes for justice concerns related to societal costs, to the extent that these are connected to the IVF part of PGD. Arguments pertaining to embryo protection are weaker as well, given that the moral costs of creating more embryos than will eventually be transferred to the womb have already been made and accepted when doing IVF. procedure may well be justified. Especially when PGD is done at the blastomere stage where early embryos consist of around eight cells, the proportionality balance may be further improved when cPGD would not require taking more than one single cell from the embryo.
Single-cell cPGD will not always be possible with current techniques, but that is expected to change with new comprehensive testing methods that pre-empt the need for using two separate test protocols for cPGD. 29 Moreover, the field is in the process of changing from blastomere to blastocyst stage PGD, where more cells are available for diagnosis, and the invasiveness is probably less.
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For both aPGD and cPGD, the reasoning in the ESHRE statement is that, with at least part of the concerns about PGD falling away, a different conclusion about the proportionality of these procedures becomes possible. Clearly, this presupposes that any remaining concerns, notably the biopsy risk in aPGD and the selective reproduction aspect in both aPGD and cPGD, would not still suffice to uphold the claim that PGD in all its forms should comply with the 'high risk of a serious condition' standard. ESHRE does not address this rejoinder. Where concerning the biopsy risk, it might have responded that this concern is widely understood as theoretical, and that as such, it is obviously not regarded as sufficiently weighty to stand in the way of allowing PGS with the aim of improving IVF results, including by countries that do insist on the 'high risk of a serious condition' standard for PGD. And with regard to 'selective reproduction', whether the concerns under this heading render PGD morally problematic is highly contested. This makes it difficult to see how these remaining issues, either separately or together, would provide sufficient grounds for maintaining the standard.
If the reasoning in the ESHRE document is sound, as we think it is, it is remarkable that its conclusions are not also reflected in any of the documents where the 'high risk of a serious condition' standard is promoted as determining acceptable PGD indications. 31 As a consequence, couples who might consider aPGD or cPGD for a less serious condition are, for no good reason, denied what may well be a meaningful option for them. Changing the relevant legal and professional guidance documents to accommodate for the altered proportionality balance in aPGD and cPGD clearly fits in with current calls for patient-centred reproductive care. 32 In this connection, it should be considered that with further developments, such as the use of whole exome sequencing in healthcare and the increased availability of expanded preconception carrier screening for couples of reproductive age, more people will become aware of being at risk of transmitting a genetic disorder, and also of being at risk for more than one such condition.
| Qualification
An important qualification that must be made with regard to both situations (aPGD and cPGD) is that the argument for allowing a lower standard no longer applies when it turns out that a further hormone stimulation cycle would be needed to complete the procedure. As chances that no transferrable embryos are obtained in one cycle will be increased with each (further) condition for which PGD is done, this will more often be the case for cPGD than for aPGD, and more often again when cPGD pertains to more than two conditions. Initiating a further cycle in the hope of generating transferable embryos not affected by the mutation or abnormality that will or may lead to the target condition (in case of aPGD) or the secondary target condition(s) (in case of cPGD), entails all the burdens, risks and (moral) costs of regular (IVF and) PGD. In the light of the 'high risk of a serious disorder' standard, this would only be acceptable when the condition for which aPGD is done, or the secondary condition(s) in cPGD, is/are sufficiently high risk and serious to qualify as a PGD indication on its/their own.
| ACCEP TAB LE TR AN S FER DECIS I ON S
A second PGD rule holds that 'affected embryos', in the sense of embryos with the targeted mutation or abnormality, are not to be transferred to the womb. 33 We will refer to this as the 'do not transfer' rule. The reason for having this rule is that PGD, also when done for only one condition, does not always produce non-affected transferrable embryos, not even after multiple hormone-stimulation cycles. In cases where no further hormone-stimulation cycles can reasonably be tried, professionals are sometimes confronted with requests to go ahead anyway and transfer an embryo with the very mutation or abnormality for which PGD was done.
Why should this not be allowed? According to ESHRE, this should be seen in the light of the general principle that professionals working in medically assisted reproduction (MAR) have a responsibility to take the welfare of the future child into account. 34 By transferring embryos or inseminating women, they are causally and intentionally involved in the conception of the resulting children. This gives them a double responsibility that is unique in medicine: not only should they provide good care to those seeking their help, but also they are expected to consider how this would affect the welfare of the child-to- Although the double responsibility of MAR professionals has mainly been debated with an eye to psychosocial concerns relevant for decisions about whom to allow access to treatment, for instance when professionals have strong reasons to doubt the parental competence of the applicants, 37 it is clear that the welfare of the child may also be at stake when affected embryos are transferred to the womb, depending on whether doing so would indeed involve a 'high risk of serious harm'. Muscular Dystrophy (DMD), would rather accept not having a child at all than consider the transfer of an embryo that would lead to a child with such a devastating disorder. Nor would most (if any) professionals regard this as an acceptable option in the light of their co-responsibility for the welfare of the child. As this was implicitly understood by all stakeholders, there was no need in those days to explicitly state the no transfer rule in centre policy documents etc.
| Front door rule and back door rule
However, things changed around a decade ago, when (as discussed in the previous section) the scope of PGD indications was widened to also include disorders -for example, certain hereditary cancer syndromes and cardiogenetic disorders -with a less than complete penetrance, a later onset, a sometimes large variability, or for which certain treatment or surveillance options also exist. It now became less unimaginable that those seeking PGD for such conditions (e.g., to avoid a child carrying a BRCA-mutation predisposing for HBOC) would ask to have an affected embryo transferred if no non-affected embryos turned out to be available. A wider opening at the front has led to pressure at the back. Still, the 'do not transfer' rule tells professionals to resist that pressure and keep the back door shut. Why?
Possible arguments refer to the aim of PGD as a medical practice.
This reasoning may take different forms. One is that adding to the global burden of disease is not something that PGD professionals, as doctors, should normally be willing to do. For instance in a focus group meeting we held with professionals to discuss their views on the matter, some pointed out that it was impossible for them to transfer an embryo that they knew to be affected, and that this was essentially different from the situation in IVF, where you don't check and don't know. 38 A related but slightly different argument pertains to the aim of PGD more specifically. Is PGD meant to prevent pregnancies that would lead to the birth of children with the targeted disorder, or can PGD also be seen as a procedure that may be tried with an eye to at least reducing the risk of that outcome? In the same focus group, some had problems with the latter view. As one participant argued: you cannot burden professionals and society with efforts and cost '(….) and then if the result is not to your liking, say thank you very much but we will take [the embryo]'. 39 Others, however, thought this should not be seen as a lack of seriousness on the part of the applicants, but as a matter of the applicants adjusting their priorities to what is realistically feasible. Even so, the question remains whether PGD professionals can be expected to make that shift as well. Many would argue that if the applicants are ready to accept a child with the mutation or disorder that PGD was meant to avoid, they should take their chances through natural conception, without burdening PGD professionals with the responsibility.
| 'Last chance' transfer requests in aPGD and cPGD
However, precisely for couples with a fertility problem this is not a very helpful advice, as natural conception is not a possible option for them. After having unsuccessfully tried several cycles of aPGD, those affected embryos do in fact represent their last chance of having a genetically related child. Which is why they ask their doctors to go ahead and transfer an embryo carrying the mutation or abnormality that through aPGD they first tried to avoid.
Clearly it would be unfair to characterize this as a capricious change of mind.
As counts for all people who come for PGD to have a healthy child, the bottom line is they want a child. If it turns out that they cannot have both, they may settle for a child with the disorder rather than having no child at all.
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And as, given their fertility problem, the only way to achieve this is to ask their doctor to transfer those last chance embryos, it seems one-sided at least to maintain that granting such requests would necessarily be at odds with the aim of PGD as a form of reproductive medicine. Provided this does not amount to taking a 'high risk of serious harm' , professionals may well consider providing this further assistance.
Requests for transferring affected embryos can also be expected in cPGD cases, even when the couples in question are normally fertile (as we will assume for the sake of argument). Given that in the experience of the PGD centre at our university, those embryos comes at the price of accepting that the child will have a disorder that they had wanted to avoid as well, but with a lower priority.
Think, for instance, of a situation in which cPGD was done for both cystic fibrosis (CF) and a BRCA mutation. The couple had wanted to avoid transmitting both these conditions, but now that this -after trying several hormone-stimulation cycles -does not work out and the only otherwise transferrable embryos are either homozygous for CF or female BRCA carriers, the couple asks for one of those BRCA embryos to be transferred.
Granting such requests may help couples who, for fear of having a child with the primary condition, would not consider natural reproduction, to still have genetically related children. Here again, it would seem difficult to maintain that this is not in line with what PGD is for.
| Responding to 'last chance' transfer requests: Three types of cases
We argue that for 'last chance' aPGD and cPGD cases, the 'do not transfer' rule needs revision. Three types of situation should be distinguished.
First, the back door should be firmly kept shut in cases where transferring 'last chance' embryos would lead to children with disorders at the higher end of the spectrum of seriousness. Clear examples would be DMD or Lesch-Nyhan syndrome. would not go ahead with transferring affected embryos because of the perceived seriousness of the condition, they might make such a further try a 'coercive offer', by insisting that their further assistance will depend on the couple's acceptance of this option.
Specifically with regard to aPGD, an interesting further alternative is IVF without PGD. For cPGD the complement of this would be to go ahead with PGD for the primary condition only. As already hinted to above, professionals may feel more comfortable with this option than with transferring an affected PGD embryo. When IVF without PGD is offered to couples at risk of transmitting a specific disorder, the 'health status' of the embryo -i.e., affected or not affected with the relevant mutation or abnormality -remains unknown. There are two main reasons why this may be felt to change the situation: the fact that the professional does not knowingly transfer an embryo that is affected, and the fact that (in IVF as in natural reproduction) the transmission risk for the mutation is 'only' 25 or 50% in Mendelian monogenetic disorders, as compared with 100% when transferring embryos known to be affected.
As 25% should still be considered 'high risk', however, it can be ques- where aPGD was done to avoid a condition leading to a seriously diminished quality of life, such as DMD or Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, the option of 'just IVF' is not really less problematic than transferring embryos known to be affected. The same would hold for the option of just testing for the primary condition in order to move on from unsuccessful cPGD involving two conditions in that same range of seriousness. On the other hand, in greyarea cases where offering 'just IVF', or 'just testing for the primary condition' might be regarded as not evidently at odds with the responsibility of professionals in assisted reproduction, it would seem that granting a request to transfer any affected embryos resulting from aPGD or cPGD need not be categorically ruled out either. A relevant consideration when further comparing these choices is that going ahead and transferring would not entail a new hormone stimulation cycle with burdens and costs attached.
In the third category of cases, aPGD or cPGD for mild conditions such as CCD, a problem would arise not so much with possible requests for transferring affected embryos, but with requests to have a further hormone stimulation cycle in order to see if such a transfer may be avoided.
As explained in the first part of this paper, the problem is that with such a further try the proportionality balance would revert to the range where PGD is only acceptable for conditions meeting the front door rule, which excludes conditions such as CCD. Indeed, if the proportionality reasoning behind that rule is to define the range of acceptable PGD indications, then any exceptions for aPGD and cPGD can only be made as long as these forms of PGD come with lower burdens, risks and costs.
| CON CLUS I ON S AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the first part of this paper, we have argued that the widely endorsed 'high risk of a serious disorder' standard for acceptable PGD indications is best understood as reflecting the proportionality of PGD. As such, however, it fails to take account of the altered proportionality balance in cases where PGD is either added to indicated fertility treatment (aPGD) or done for a secondary condition in combination with a primary PGD indication (cPGD). We conclude that on the basis of the reasoning behind the 'high risk of a serious disorder' standard, these specific forms of PGD should also be allowed for conditions of lower risk and seriousness, provided that no further hormone stimulation cycles are needed for completing those procedures.
In the second part of the paper, we have pointed out that because aPGD and cPGD may both lead to 'last chance embryo' situations, professionals may increasingly be confronted with requests to make an exception to the traditional rule that embryos affected by the targeted condition should not be transferred. Based on the reasoning behind that rule, our conclusion is that if aPGD or cPGD is done for conditions that are clearly not 'high risk and serious', there is no reason for problematizing such 'last chance' transfer requests.
However, the bottom line remains that if transfer of an affected embryo would entail a high risk of a child with a seriously diminished quality of life, professionals should reject such requests.
The importance of holding on to the 'do not transfer' rule in those cases exceeds the present discussion of aPGD and cPGD: with the introduction of generic genome-wide methods for PGD analysis 43 , incidental findings can be expected that will lead to embryos known to be affected with mutations or abnormalities not related to the condition or conditions for which PGD was done, leading to difficult 'last chance' transfer decisions of the same kind as in cPGD.
We recommend that relevant legal or professional guidance documents should be changed to accommodate for our conclusions.
Couples who might want to make use of aPGD or cPGD should be given that option, also in cases where the condition or conditions to be avoided are not 'high risk and serious'. As part of pretreatment informed consent, they should be made aware that these procedures
